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We provide a brief review and analysis of recent trends in international financial 
integration. In particular, we highlight the asymmetric nature of financial 
globalization, with the scale of cross-border positions among the advanced economies 
growing more quickly than for emerging market economies and developing countries. 
We investigate the sources of this divergent pattern and discuss the factors that could 
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Barbara Pels, and Martin Schmitz for excellent research assistance. Over the past decade, emerging markets have accounted for a growing fraction of world GDP 
and international trade (reflecting fast growth in China and India, but also strong economic 
performance across the board). And the spectacular increase in foreign exchange reserve 
holdings, the growing importance of sovereign wealth funds, and the pattern of global 
imbalances more generally suggest that these countries are also playing a major role in 
financial globalization. 
But is this really the case? Figure 1, which shows the fractions of global trade and 
global cross-border holdings of financial instruments that are accounted for by the advanced 
economies, gives us some pause.
1 Over the past decade, these economies’ share of world 
trade has substantially declined but their share of cross-border financial holdings has 
increased. This increase has occurred despite some decrease in their share of world financial 
market capitalization (Table 1). The table also shows that the increased share is most 
pronounced in cross-border non-reserve debt assets and debt liabilities (such as debt 
securities, loans, and deposits), even if the decline in their share of foreign exchange reserves 
has been precipitous. 
  What can help explain these stylized facts? And, more generally, what explains the 
differing degree of international financial integration across advanced economies, emerging 
markets, and developing countries? And what are the policy implications and risks deriving 
from the sharp trend towards increasing cross-border asset trade? In what follows, we provide 




                                                 
1 We include in this category: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.   2













Note:  Authors’ calculations based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and WDI data. 
 
Table 1.  Global Shares of Advanced Countries 
 
Global Totals  1996  2006  External Categories  1996  2006 
Trade 67.4  58.4  Debt  assets    84.0  88.6 
Stock market capitalization  87.9  83.3  Debt liabilities   80.3  90.3 
Debt securities outstanding  93.8  90.9  Portfolio equity assets   92.6  90.8 
Bank deposits  87.2  79.1  Portfolio equity liabilities   90.1  86.2 
Foreign assets  84.2  85.6  FDI assets   90.2  89.1 
Foreign liabilities  81.1  86.5  FDI liabilities   72.3  73.8 
     Reserves  48.3  28.3 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), IFS, WDI, World 





I.  The Differential Nature of Financial Globalization 
 
The patterns we just outlined reflect the tremendous heterogeneity in international financial 
linkages that have been generated by the current phase of financial globalization. As a group,   3
the advanced economies are characterized by extensive cross-border asset trade. In addition 
to the stimulus provided by earlier waves of capital account liberalization, financial 
deregulation, and falling communications costs, a major factor driving cross-border 
integration in recent years has been the pace of financial innovation. The growth in cross-
border financial holdings among advanced economies has been driven by sectoral trends such 
as securitization, the rise of hedge funds, and the widespread use of offshore special purpose 
vehicles by financial and non-financial corporations. As vividly illustrated by the events of 
2007, financial innovation in one economy raises demand by foreign investors in other 
advanced economies that wish to gain exposure to new asset classes. Moreover, much of this 
new activity has been directed at arbitraging differences across jurisdictions in asset prices 
and tax and regulatory systems, generating a strong connection between financial innovation 
and financial globalization.  
An additional factor driving the growth in cross-border asset trade among the 
advanced economies has been the creation of the euro. Together with parallel moves by the 
European Union (EU) to create a single market in financial services, the impact of monetary 
union has been to integrate money and credit markets across the member countries. The 
elimination of currency risk among the member countries means that there is a much higher 
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign securities, which has contributed to a 
substantial reduction in home bias and increased financial trade within the euro area. 
Moreover, the greater depth and liquidity of a single area-wide financial markets has also 
boosted financial trade vis-à-vis non-member countries. (Indeed, the United Kingdom has 
been a primary beneficiary as a key center for euro-denominated financial trade, although it is 
not a member of the monetary union.)   
For the period 1999-2006, the data indeed show a significant increase in intra-euro 
area holdings as a share of world cross-border holdings (from 13½ percent to 17¾ percent for   4
the sum of assets and liabilities) as well as of external euro area holdings (from 21½  percent 
to 24½ percent). Netting out intra-euro area holdings from world cross-border holdings, the 
share of external holdings accounted for by non-advanced economies would be broadly stable 
(rather than declining) over the period 1999-2006, with an increase in their share of cross-
border assets and a decline in the share of cross-border liabilities. 
In general, the typical emerging market economy or developing country has much 
smaller cross-border asset and liability positions (with a median of 70 to 80 percent of GDP) 
than an advanced economy (for which the median value is well over 200 percent of GDP). In 
particular, the financial sectors in these countries have not participated to the same degree in 
the wave of financial innovation that has swept the advanced economies. In addition, cross-
border currency risk remains a primary concern for most countries in this group, which limits 
participation in many types of cross-border financial transactions.  
That said, as emphasized by Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007), it 
is important to acknowledge that the external balance sheets of these countries have shifted 
over the last decade. First, this group has strongly improved its net external position: in a 
reversal of historical patterns, the advanced group has been a net issuer of liabilities to the 
developing world. Indeed, the trend documented in Figure 1 primarily reflects a decline in 
external liabilities—particularly in the debt category—which in turn is linked to the de-
leveraging process in several emerging markets following the Asian crisis. Second, equity 
instruments (especially FDI) now account for a much larger share of external liabilities, such 
that domestic production risks are now shared to a much greater degree with outside 
investors. Third, the gross scale of foreign asset holdings has substantially expanded, with the 
growth in external assets primarily taking the form of official reserves—the monetary 
authority is the main proximate foreign investor. Overall, advanced countries are typically 
‘long equity, short debt’ with the opposite pattern holding for most other countries.    5
In summary, the considerable variation in cross-border positions means that the 
international financial transmission mechanism is quite complex, with a local shock in one 
economy having a differential impact on partner countries, according to the level and 
composition of bilateral investment positions and the nature of co-movements between home 
and partner financial returns. Moreover, heterogeneity in the bilateral transmission of shocks 
is reinforced by the asymmetries between international financial linkages and international 
trade linkages, with the degree of trade integration between advanced and developing 
countries relatively stronger than the degree of financial integration. 
In view of the importance of international financial integration in understanding 
macroeconomic behavior, we next investigate more formally the sources of cross-country 
variation in the extent of financial globalization.  
II.  Cross-Country Variation in Financial Globalization  
 
As a first pass, we focus on a few central factors affecting international financial integration 
that have been much covered in the theoretical literature: (a) trade openness; (b) domestic 
financial development; (c) economic development; (d) country size; (e) capital account 
restrictions; (f) EU integration; and (g) financial centers.
2  
  Several strands in the research literature have argued that trade openness and financial 
openness should go hand in hand (see in particular Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff 
2001 and Maurice Obstfeld 2007). From a risk sharing perspective, the gains to international 
portfolio diversification are increasing in the importance of tradables consumption in many 
models (although it is possible to build examples in which higher consumption of imports 
raises the optimal home bias in financial portfolios). Trade linkages may also plausibly 
                                                 
2 Our approach builds on previous work reported in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), which 
focused exclusively on advanced economies.   6
improve information flows and thereby increase the willingness to invest in foreign assets. 
Default risk is also ameliorated by tighter trade integration. Finally, trade transactions directly 
generate cross-border financial flows (trade credits, export insurance, payment facilitation).  
  A second driver of financial globalization is domestic financial development. The 
development of a domestic banking system and domestic financial markets facilitates asset 
trade among local residents and thereby potentially diminishes the role of external financial 
intermediaries in linking together domestic agents. However, domestic financial development 
may be spurred by foreign investment in the domestic financial system, and the creation of 
domestic financial products also facilitates foreign demand for domestic liabilities (Philippe 
Martin and Hélène Rey 2004), thus suggesting a positive correlation between financial 
development and financial globalization. A related emergent literature has focused on the 
difficulties faced by some non-advanced economies in the creation of financial assets. 
Moreover, the institutional capability accumulated by investing in domestic markets lowers 
the barrier to acquiring foreign assets, implying potentially strong complementarities between 
the growth of domestic financial positions and external financial positions.  
  The level of economic development can also be an important factor in explaining 
domestic residents’ propensity to engage in cross-border asset trade. For example, in the 
presence of fixed costs or less-than-proportional learning costs of international asset trade we 
would expect to see higher international financial integration in wealthier economies. Also,  
if risk aversion is declining in the level of wealth and international investment is perceived as 
riskier, external exposure will be increasing in the level of development. The theoretical link 
between the size of an economy and its level of cross-border holdings is also clear—ceteris 
paribus, larger economies allow for more domestic portfolio diversification.  
  A history of capital account restrictions plausibly has a negative impact on the 
accumulated stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. Moreover, in the presence of binding   7
capital controls, progress in domestic financial development may not spill over into a greater 
degree of international financial integration. Finally, two additional related factors are worth 
considering. As discussed earlier, the deepening of financial integration in the EU and the 
disappearance of currency risk for intra-euro area asset trade were associated with a sharp rise 
in cross-border holdings. We therefore allow for the possibility that advanced economies in 
the EU and neighboring countries strongly integrated with those (Iceland, Norway, and 
Switzerland) may—ceteris paribus—have higher external assets and liabilities. Finally, some 
economies (such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) are 
important international financial centers and hence have larger external portfolios. 
Accordingly, in order to characterize the cross-country variation in external positions 
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where  i F  is the level of foreign assets (liabilities) as a share of GDP,  i TRADE is the trade-
GDP ratio,  i FINDEV  is a measure of domestic financial development (the sum of stock 
market capitalization and bank deposits as a share of GDP), GDPPC is GDP per capita, POP 
is population size,  i CAPOPEN  is the de jure index of capital account openness developed by 
Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito (2007), EUR is a dummy taking the value of 1 for the EU15 plus 
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland (and zero otherwise), and FINCTR is a dummy taking the 
value of 1 for international financial centers. All variables except CAPOPEN and the two 
dummies are expressed in log terms. We exclude smaller economies with large financial 
centers (such as Hong Kong S.A.R., Ireland, Luxembourg, and Singapore) where external 
holdings are significant multiples of GDP.  
The results for both external assets and liabilities are presented in Table 2 for the 
entire sample, as well as separately for advanced economies and emerging markets. The   8
coefficient signs on drivers of financial globalization conform to theoretical priors, and their 
impact is in general statistically and economically significant. In particular, international 
financial integration is strongly positively correlated with indicators of financial development 
(FINDEV as well as FINCTR), the “advanced Europe” dummy, GDP per capita (which may 
also proxy for other aspects of financial development not adequately captured by the 
FINDEV indicator), and, for the whole sample and emerging markets, negatively related to 
country size. In particular, the estimated EUR coefficient implies that, other things equal, 
cross-border asset holdings in advanced European countries are about 200 percent of GDP 
larger than elsewhere, and liabilities also significantly larger. Since we control for financial 
development, this suggests lower home bias in Europe.  
It is also interesting to note that the link between trade and financial integration, while 
positive, is not as strong or as precisely estimated as the link with economic or financial 
development. This cross-sectional result is consistent with the time series trends shown in 
Figure 1, which show a significant difference in the evolution of the global trade and 
financial asset shares of advanced economies and emerging markets.  
  The one variable whose conditional correlation with financial integration is 
economically and statistically insignificant across the three samples is the measure of capital 
account openness. This variable, which has a very strong bivariate correlation with both 
external assets and liabilities, is also strongly correlated with GDP per capita, as well as with 
financial development, the EUR dummy, and the financial center dummy. However, once we 
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Table 2. The Drivers of International Financial Integration 
 













  FA FL FA FL FA FL 
        
TRADE  0.20 0.13 0.43 0.11 0.18 0.18 
 [0.11]*  [0.08]  [0.17]**  [0.19] [0.15] [0.11] 
        
FINDEV  0.33 0.15 0.67 0.18 0.33 0.14 
 [0.08]***  [0.06]**  [0.25]**  [0.26] [0.10]***  [0.07]* 
        
GDP per capita  0.23  0.16  0.63  -0.07  0.18  0.14 
 [0.05]***  [0.04]*** [0.22]**  [0.23] [0.06]***  [0.05]***
        
Population  -0.07 -0.13 0.04  -0.08 -0.13 -0.14 
 [0.04]*  [0.03]*** [0.06]  [0.06] [0.05]**  [0.04]***
        
CAPOPEN  -0.05 -0.04 0.02  -0.22 -0.07 -0.05 
 [0.04]  [0.03]  [0.19]  [0.21] [0.05] [0.04] 
        
Europe  0.76 0.53 0.73 0.54    
 [0.15]***  [0.11]*** [0.17]*** [0.18]**     
        
Financial  Center  0.62 0.61 0.20 0.63    
 [0.22]***  [0.17]*** [0.25]  [0.27]**     
        
Constant  0.93 4.10 -7.79  6.04 2.29 4.37 
 [1.01]  [0.77]*** [2.95]**  [3.19]* [1.32]* [0.98]***
        
Observations  67 67 21 21 46 46 
R-squared  0.87 0.85 0.9  0.82 0.60 0.66 
 
Note: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels respectively. FA (FL) is the ratio of foreign assets (liabilities) to GDP; 
TRADE is ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (WDI database); FINDEV is ratio of sum of 
stock market capitalization and bank deposits to GDP (World Bank and other sources); 
CAPOPEN is Chinn-Ito index of de jure capital account openness; the Europe dummy takes 
value 1 for EU15 plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and 0 otherwise; FINCENTER dummy 
takes value 1 for UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and 0 otherwise.   10
Turning to the difference between external assets and liabilities, two features are 
worth noticing. First, the correlation with GDP per capita is stronger for external assets than 
for external liabilities, consistent with the positive correlation between economic 
development and the net external position documented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007. 
Second, the link with domestic financial development also appears stronger for assets than for 
liabilities, even though our indicator of domestic financial development includes external 
holdings of domestic instruments. While our simple regressions are simply descriptive 
statistics, this suggests a strong complementarity between domestic financial development 
and external holdings, rather than substitutability between the two.  
III.  Future Trends 
 
Our analysis suggests that the future path for international financial integration 
depends on the deepening of domestic financial systems, overall economic development, as 
well as the pace of trade integration. In particular, it is plausible to expect some degree of 
convergence in the scale and characteristics of international financial integration between the 
advanced and developing country groups, conditional on the latter group making progress in 
domestic financial development. A more sophisticated domestic financial sector – comprising 
domestic retail and investment banks, institutional investors, and mutual funds - will give rise 
to greater private-sector capability in the acquisition of foreign assets and sustainable 
issuance of foreign liabilities. Moreover, the emergence of strong and well-regulated 
domestic banking sectors will enable governments to do away with capital account 
restrictions and also move towards more flexible exchange rate regimes. Through such 
developments, the role of reserves as the main asset category of the external balance sheet 
will decline and the asymmetries between the international investment profiles of advanced 
and developing countries will diminish. Indeed, the increasing role of sovereign wealth funds   11
in several emerging markets is likely associated at the country level—even if not from the 
point of view of ownership—with a more diversified pattern of foreign investment. 
While the financial convergence process may play out as described above over the 
medium term, international financial integration carries risks. In particular, lower-income 
countries (especially those that exhibit limited trade openness) are more vulnerable to self-
fulfilling pessimism among investors (as captured in the model of Martin and Rey 2006). 
Smaller, less liquid financial systems also find it harder to absorb shifts in global portfolio 
weights, as is well illustrated by the difficulties encountered by many emerging markets and 
developing countries in managing the surge in capital inflows in recent years. In this context, 
the substantial decline in home bias in advanced economies, together with their more 
advanced stage of financial development, has implied a spectacular increase in the amount of 
cross-border capital, and hence the potential for significant effects on individual countries of 
even modest shifts in cross-border portfolio allocation.  
Indeed, one objective behind repressive financial policies in some countries has been 
precisely to provide some insulation from the effects of shifts in international capital flows. 
While the challenges posed by the boom in international capital flows can be daunting, it is 
worth questioning the validity of this strategy. In particular, the positive relation between 
financial development and economic growth is among the most results in the empirical 
growth literature. Accordingly, although financial repression may reduce the risk of crisis 
episodes, the net impact on long-term growth may be negative (Romain Ranciere, Aaron 
Tornell, and Frank Westermann 2008). Finally, the mechanisms by which trade openness 
matters for financial integration remain opaque. Since the correct interpretation of this 
correlation is important in the design of international macroeconomic models, the resolution 
of this puzzle is a high priority for future research.   12
REFERENCES 
 
Chinn, Menzie and Hiro Ito. 2007. “A New Measure of Financial Openness.” Mimeo, 
University of Wisconsin. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund). 
Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 2003. “International Financial 
Integration.” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 50(S): 82-113. 
Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 2007. “The External Wealth of Nations 
Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004.” 
Journal of International Economics, 73(2): 223-250.  
Martin, Philippe and Helene Rey. 2004. “Financial Super-Markets: Size Matters for Asset 
Trade.” Journal of International Economics, 64(2): 335-361. 
Martin, Philippe and Helene Rey. 2006. “Globalization and Emerging Markets: With or 
without Crash?”   American Economic Review, 96(5), 1631-1651. 
Obstfeld, Maurice. 2007. “International Risk Sharing and the Costs of Trade.” Ohlin 
Lectures. 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2001. “The Six Major Puzzles in International 
Macroeconomics: Is there a Common Cause?”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 15: 339-390. 
Ranciere, Romain, Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann. 2008. “Systemic Crises and 
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
World Bank. World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: The World Bank).  
 Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland